Why do stock and housing markets sometimes experience amazing booms followed by massive busts and why is this happening more and more frequently? Boom and Bust reveals why bubbles happen, and why some bubbles have catastrophic economic, social and political consequences, whilst others have actually benefited society.
This paper describes six stylized patterns among housing markets in the United States that potential explanations of the housing boom and bust should seek to explain. First, individual housing markets in the U.S. experienced considerable heterogeneity in the amplitudes of their cycles. Second, the areas with the biggest boom-bust cycles in the 2000s also had the largest boom-busts in the 1980s and 1990s, with a few telling exceptions. Third, the timing of the cycles differed across housing markets. Fourth, the largest booms and busts, and their timing, seem to be clustered geographically. Fifth, the cross sectional variance of annual house price changes rises in booms and declines in busts. Finally, these stylized facts are robust to controlling for housing demand fundamentals - namely, rents, incomes, or employment - although changes in fundamentals are correlated with changes in prices.
International investors poured vast sums of money into East Asian and Latin American countries during the mid-1990s, when the emerging market boom was at its peak. Then Thailand stumbled and panic seized the markets, and boom gave way to bust. Investors suffered large financial losses, while Asian countries suddenly experienced large capital outflows and the macroeconomic pressures these wrought plunged countries that had been growing rapidly ("miraculously") into crisis. Much the same had happened in Latin America when the debt crisis broke in 1982. This book investigates what can be done to make the international capital market a constructive force in promoting development in emerging markets. John Williamson concludes that the problem of cyclicality that has undermined the value of international borrowing cannot be tackled just, or even mainly, from the supply side, but will require actions on the part of both creditors and debtors.
"Most measures of the American economy over the past two centuries or so produce a jagged sine wave--"irrationally exuberant" highs leading to painful lows. Bubbles lead to panics, over and over again. Payne has written a short book on the 1920s to demonstrate to undergraduates how this pattern emerges, especially how the highs get to be so high--specifically during the 1920s, which seem to offer instructive examples of the worst practices and circumstances. This "How Things Worked" volume explains market mechanisms, popular pressures, and the workings or failings of regulation. While every drop in the economy has its peculiar features, that of 1929 has the markings of a classic"--
In this paper we characterize empirically the comovements of macro variables typically observed in middle income countries, as well as the boom-bust cycle' that has been observed during the last two decades. We find that many countries that have liberalized their financial markets, have witnessed the development of lending booms. Most of the time the boom gradually decelerates. But sometimes the boom ends in twin currency and banking crises, and is followed by a protracted credit crunch that outlives a short-lived recession. We also find that during lending booms there is a real appreciation and the nontradables (N) sector grows faster than the tradables (T) sector. Meanwhile, the opposite is true in the aftermath of crisis. We argue that these comovements are generated by the interaction of two characteristics of financing typical of middle income countries: risky currency mismatch and asymmetric financing opportunities across the N- and T-sectors.
“Excellent . . . I highly recommend this book.” —RON PAUL Why is the boom-and-bust cycle so persistent? Why did economists fail to predict the economic meltdown that began in 2007—or to pull us out of the crisis more quickly? And how can we prevent future calamities? Mainstream economics has no adequate answers for these pressing questions. To understand how we got here, and how we can ensure prosperity, we must turn to an alternative to the dominant approach: the Austrian School of economics. Unfortunately, few people have even a vague understanding of the Austrian School, despite the prominence of leading figures such as Nobel Prize winner F. A. Hayek, author of The Road to Serfdom. Harry C. Veryser corrects that problem in this powerful and eye-opening book. In presenting the Austrian School’s perspective, he reveals why the boom-and-bust cycle is unnatural and unnecessary. Veryser tells the fascinating (but frightening) story of how our modern economic condition developed. The most recent recession, far from being an isolated incident, was part of a larger cycle that has been the scourge of the West for a century—a cycle rooted in government manipulation of markets and currency. The lesson is clear: the devastation of the recent economic crisis—and of stagflation in the 1970s, and of the Great Depression in the 1930s—could have been avoided. It didn’t have to be this way. Too long unappreciated, the Austrian School of economics reveals the crucial conditions for a successful economy and points the way to a free, prosperous, and humane society.
Why are housing markets so prone to boom-bust cycles? The mortgage market structure prior to the Savings and Loan crisis contributed to the volatility in real housing activity which, in turn, amplified the volatility in housing prices. The subsequent development of a national, market-based system of securitized mortgage finance has damped this boom-bust cycle. We test whether deviations of actual housing prices from values forecast by a model based on economic fundamentals have responded to the change in financial structure, and find that pricing errors have fallen significantly since the mid-1980s. Tests of the relative importance of the change in financial market structure versus the reduction of inflation over this period indicate a primary role for market structure in improving pricing efficiency.
Traces the history of a New York office building to argue that one of the strengths of capitalism is that when economic booms lead inevitably to busts, the system is prepared to take advantage of its failures
