Basic scientific research and technological development have had an enormous impact on innovation, economic growth, and social well-being. Yet science policy debates have long been dominated by advocates for particular scientific fields or missions. In the absence of a deeper understanding of the changing framework in which innovation occurs, policymakers cannot predict how best to make and manage investments to exploit our most promising and important opportunities. Since 2005, a science of science policy has developed rapidly in response to policymakers' increased demands for better tools and the social sciences' capacity to provide them. The Science of Science Policy: A Handbook brings together some of the best and brightest minds working in science policy to explore the foundations of an evidence-based platform for the field. The contributions in this book provide an overview of the current state of the science of science policy from three angles: theoretical, empirical, and policy in practice. They offer perspectives from the broader social science, behavioral science, and policy communities on the fascinating challenges and prospects in this evolving arena. Drawing on domestic and international experiences, the text delivers insights about the critical questions that create a demand for a science of science policy.
Droughts occur in arid and semi-arid areas of the world, but also in humid areas, and can develop over short periods (flash drought) or longer periods (seasons/decades). Even though progress has been made, it remains difficult to adequately characterize, monitor, forecast and manage droughts, due to their multi-faceted nature.Usually, drought does
If indeed scientists and technologists, especially economists, set much of the agenda by which the future is played out, and I think they do, then the student of scientific methodology and public ethics has at least three options. He can embrace certain scientific methods and the value they hold for social decisionmaking, much as Milton Friedman has accepted neoclassical econom ics. Or, he can condemn them, regardless of their value, much as Stuart Hampshire has rejected risk-cost-benefit analysis (RCBA). Finally, he can critically assess these scientific methods and attempt to provide solutions to the problems he has uncovered. As a philosopher of science seeking the middle path between uncritical acceptance and extremist rejection of the economic methods used in policy analysis, I have tried to avoid the charge of being "anti science". Fred Hapgood, in response to my presentation at a recent Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, said that my arguments "felt like" a call for rejection of the methods of risk-cost-benefit analysis. Not so, as Chapter Two of this volume should make eminently clear. All my criticisms are construc tive ones, and the flaws in economic methodology which I address are uncovered for the purpose of suggesting means of making good techniques better. Likewise, although I criticize the economic methodology by which many technology assessments (TA's) and environmental-impact analyses (EIA's) have been used to justify public projects, it is wrong to conclude that I am anti-technology.